Become-Cyborg! by Brassett, Jamie
 
‘Your mistake’, Ng says, ‘is that  you think 
that all mechanically assisted organisms – like 
me – are pathetic cripples.  In fact, we are 
better than we were before’.  (Stephenson 
1993:231) 
 
Technology  must cease to evolve with the 
goal of getting humans out of the loop, and 
aim instead at  forming with humans a higher 
level, synergistic machine.  (De Landa  
1991:217) 
 fig.1 
[The next generation of our technology] will 
enter every home and office and intercede 
between us and much of the information and 
experience we receive. The design of such 
intimate technology is an aesthetic issue as 
much as an engineering one. We must 
recognise this if we are to understand and 
choose what we become as a result of what we 
have made.  (Myron Kruger, ‘Responsive 
Environments’ quoted in Rheingold 1992:113) 
 
  fig.2 
 
 
Introduction1  
 
The second most often asked question of those with pierced bodies (after, ‘Didn’t 
that hurt?’) is ‘Why (on Earth!) did you do that?’ There are as many possible 
answers to this question, however, as there are body-parts to pierce. Yet there 
seems to be a growing part of ‘the scene’ that wishes to call itself ‘Modern 
                                                
1 I must thank Ruth Adams (University of Lancaster) for a preview copy of her 
dissertation, ‘Conceptual Problems of Body Modification: “Modern Primitives” and New 
Age religion’; and Tim Sanderson (Central St Martins College of Art and Design) for his, 
‘Two + Two = Elephants: Evolution and Art’, as both were very helpful in directing the 
mutation of this piece. 
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Primitive’, thereby structuring its response to this question of ‘Why . . . ?’ within a 
(borrowed) system of ritual and belief. (This desire to reinscribe an ancient, 
spiritual dimension within contemporary life is common in many current lifestyle 
choices and even political actions. For example, some aspects of rave culture 
borrow much of their iconography and spirituality from Hinduism; note especially 
the London clubs, Escape from Samsara, Institute of Goa, Return to the Source, 
Megatripolis. . . . And many roads protest groups – who are strongly allied with 
free party networks – graft their environmentalism onto Ancient Celtic spiritualism 
and even modern Astrology.) What does it mean, then, to be a ‘Modern Primitive’? 
 Fakir Musafar, celebrated Body Modifier, performer, shaman and 
editor/publisher of ‘Body Play and Modern Primitives Quarterly’, coined the term 
‘Modern Primitive’ (also used by Vale and Juno in their collection of the same 
name) to describe the subjective stance that he (and those on whom he practices) 
occupies. Increasingly disaffected with the fragmentation and lack of spiritual 
direction offered by contemporary (Western) culture, the ‘Modern Primitives’ look 
to the cultures of others (often marginalised by the mainstream and idealised by the 
underground) to offer their lives structure. In the editorial to ‘Body Play’, entitled 
‘Worship Through The Body’, Fakir writes: 
I was in Malaysia this August on a specific mission: to investigate the 
possibility of participating in their Thaipusam in January 1995 . . . I waited 
52 years to connect with the ‘source’ of my inspiration for ‘worship through 
the body’. . . . I had real insight during my August trip – an insight about the 
value of offering one’s body as a gift to deities, revered ones and ancestors. 
One has choices in life. You can believe in an invisible world or not. And if 
you feel there are beings besides the ones you can see and touch, you can 
either ignore them or reach out and honor them. Your active worship of 
invisible beings, if they are real to you, will then come back as real gifts and 
blessings.  (Musafar 1994b:3)  
This Editorial then documents in words and photographs Musafar’s involvement in 
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three different piercing rituals: the Tamil Hindu Thaipusam Festival in Malaysia; 
the ‘Sun Dance’ ritual of North American Sioux culture (extensively detailed in 
Issue 9); and the Sufi Dervishes of the Rufiah culture.  How PoMo can you get? At 
a time when meaning is constantly undermined by hypertextual anarchy and when 
spirituality has been usurped by technology, the ‘Modern Primitive’ is in desperate 
need for a ‘Return to the Source’ of Being.   
 This all seems rather obsessional to me.  Remember how Kant articulated 
the rigid construction of the subject in his first Critique and the way that his 
aesthetic theory at first dissolved this rigidity and then reconstrained it, in his third 
Critique?2 Much the same is happening with certain Body Modifiers wishing to 
reinscribe their practices within ancient cultural formations. What is this Primitive 
apart from an idealised reconstruction of something that was absorbed, surpassed, 
chewed-up and spat-out by the Capitalist Machine long ago? Just as the obsessive 
reinscribes its body (and all the possibilities for its body) within an ideal rigid 
structure of ritualised cleansing, organisation, movement, chanting or whatever, so 
too does the ‘Modern Primitive’ ritualise its body-changes within a similar  Ideal 
organisation. But it doesn’t have to be this way. There is a way to disrupt this 
obsessive organisation of the ‘Modern Primitive’ and for this we need to take the 
line of flight of the Cyborg. Maybe one day – the same day that De Landa’s robot 
historian comes to write the history of its race (along the lines of War in the Age of 
Intelligent Machines  [1991]) – a Cyborg historian will think with affection of its 
own idealised primitives, the Body Modifiers of today.  
 The project of this piece, then, is to articulate ‘Becoming-Cyborg’ in such a 
way that those Body Modifiers among us can steer away from the theological 
restrictions of the ‘Modern Primitive’. Let us first, then, introduce some ideas 
                                                
2  See Kant 1933:B133 and B277;  Kant 1952:175–7; see also, Brassett 1991 and Brassett 
in Earnshaw 1994, for a more detailed discussion of Kant’s methods of subjectification. 
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about ‘Becoming’. 
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Becoming and bits of bodies 
 
Apparently, PoMo really knows where it is when it comes to Becoming and its 
traditional adversary, Being. In his detailed and well-traced outline of the ways of 
Modernism and PoMo (The Condition of Postmodernity [1990]), David Harvey 
clearly identifies (and rigidifies) the location of this age-old distinction. His guide 
leads us as follows:  Being = stasis, the aesthetics of place and the politics of the 
fascist, and can be thought of as PoMo;  Becoming = ethics of time and space, and 
the politics of change, and can be broadly painted as Modernist. With this simple 
formulation we can easily orientate ourselves in this book. Which is made even 
easier as Harvey places a big arrow with the legend ‘I am here’ at the point where 
Modernist = Becoming: ‘There are some who would have us return to classicism 
and others who seek to tread the path of the moderns. From the standpoint of the 
latter, every age is judged to attain “the fullness of time, not by being but by 
becoming”. I could not agree more’ (Harvey 1990:359). 
 On the face of it, Harvey’s account of (and preference for) Becoming over 
Being seems laudable to me; but I can’t help being put off by his desire to bind it 
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in the shackles of a nostalgia for Modernism. The Modernism = Becoming beloved 
by Harvey, is that which provides a unified response to a world experienced as 
fragmentary and disintegrating;3 and as Harvey makes clear throughout his book, 
the Modernist response to fragmentation (whether articulated through philosophy, 
literature or architecture) is to impose upon it an ever more sturdy rational system.4 
The critic and theorist Fredric Jameson unwittingly provides a perfect commentary 
upon the relationship between Harvey’s  longing for a lost Modernism and the 
‘Modern Primitive’s’ desire for a return to spiritual perfection, in his Fables of 
Aggression. Wyndham Lewis, the Modernist as Fascist (1979). He writes (in one of 
his characteristically huge sentences, which I have truncated): 
The modernist gesture is thus ideological and Utopian all at once: 
perpetuating the increasing subjectivisation of individual experience . . . , it 
also embodies a will to overcome the commodification of late nineteenth-
century capitalism, and to substitute for the mouldering and overstuffed 
bazaar of late Victorian life the mystique and promise of some intense and 
heightened, more authentic experience.  (Jameson 1979:39)  
We can see that Harvey’s Modernist = Becoming and Fakir Musafar’s Body 
Modifiers = Modern Primitives operate along the same organisational lines.  Both 
demand allegiance to an authenticity that once was but is now no more. A 
definition of Becoming which nostalgically looks backward and hopes for the 
                                                
3  In the Preface to the 1909 edition of his novel What Maisie Knew [1897], Henry James 
wrote: ‘The one presented register of the whole complexity would be the play of the 
child’s confused and obscure notion of it, and yet the whole, as I say, should be 
unmistakably, should be honourably there, seen through the faint intelligence, or at least 
attested by the imponderable presence, and still advertising its sense’ (James 1966:9). 
While this provides a perfect description of the literary modernist’s writing practice, it 
also shows the way in which Modernism as a whole embraced the notion of structure at a 
time when the certainties of Victorian life were believed to be crumbling. 
 
4  Once again this movement is reminiscent of Kant’s restratification of the anarchic 
aesthetic experience under the diktat of Reason, in his Critique of Judgement.  See also 
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recovery of a paradise now lost.   
 My own cartography of Becoming, however, follows the vectors announced 
by Deleuze and Guattari in their ‘Capitalism and Schizophrenia’ volumes: Anti-
Oedipus (1984) and A Thousand Plateaus (1987). In the second of these books, 
they explain: 
Becoming is a rhizome, not a classificatory or genealogical tree.  Becoming 
is certainly not imitating or identifying with something; neither is it 
regressing-progressing; neither is it corresponding, establishing 
corresponding relations; neither is it producing, producing a filiation, or 
producing through filiation. Becoming is a verb with a consistency all its 
own; it does not reduce to, or lead back to, ‘appearing’, ‘being’, ‘equalling’, 
or ‘producing’. (Deleuze and Guattari 1987:239)  
For Deleuze and Guattari Becoming renounces all attempts at organisation and 
actively seeks to destroy not only the structures of rational authority, but also the 
moral high-ground that Harvey wants occupied by no-one but the avant-garde.  
For Harvey, Becoming is synonymous with Progress; the Progress revered by 
Hegel and his followers as Dialectic. But, as the quotation from A Thousand 
Plateaus (1987) above shows, progress (and, ‘Modern Primitives’ should note, 
regress) has nothing to do with their sense of Becoming.5 In A Thousand Plateaus 
(1987), they write: ‘A line of becoming is not defined by the points that it 
connects, or by the points that compose it; on the contrary, it passes between  
points, it comes up through the middle, it runs perpendicular to the points first 
perceived, transversally to the localisable relation to distant or contiguous points’  
(Deleuze and Guattari 1987:293). Unlike the conception favoured by Harvey, this 
                                                                                                                                                       
fn.2. 
5  In the works produced by Deleuze and Guattari – not only their ‘Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia’ volumes, but their Qu’est-ce que la philosophie?  (1991) too – Becoming 
is wrapped up with many of their favourite terms: deterritorialisation, rhizomes, smooth 
space and nomads, to name only a few. 
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Becoming is not so easy to pin down. Becoming as Progress (or even a Return to 
Progress) has very definite points of origin and aim, and although it may designate 
movement over stagnation, it is a movement which is allowed only a very limited 
range of options. Here, however, Deleuze and Guattari describe a Becoming that 
doesn’t work on this ‘join-the-dots’ principle. This Becoming is not goal-
orientated, it is not a teleology; rather, it dissipates a stratified system of goals – 
arranged like points in Cartesian geometry – by ensuring that any point is passed 
through.  We are left with Becoming that is not a hierarchy of goals, but is ‘a verb 
with a consistency all its own’. For Deleuze and Guattari, Becoming is what 
swarms do, it is how Nomads relate to smooth space6 and how rhizomes erupt . . . 
and it has an intense relationship with the Body without Organs. Before the 
concept of Becoming is fleshed out, I will mention Bodies without Organs, as they 
will also be useful in understanding Cyborgs. 
 As they first disrupt the organised body/mind, subject/object dualities, 
Deleuze and Guattari focus upon Artaud’s creation of the Body without Organs 
(BwO). The BwO produces nothing; it is nothing more than a collection of 
machinic interfaces upon a general plane of desirous fluctuations. It has no 
organisation and no purpose. The BwO is recognised only as a machinic amalgam; 
not an organism; not the organised, systematised body with all its parts allocated a 
specific role; but an agglomeration defined by the desires it couples.  In ‘plateau’ 6 
of their A Thousand Plateaus (1987), designated as ‘November 8, 1947: How Do 
You Make Yourself a Body Without Organs?’7 Deleuze and Guattari write: 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
6  This is further allied to the notion of ‘Cartography’ not only in the joint works of Deleuze 
and Guattari already mentioned, but also in Guattari’s Cartographies Schizoanalytiques 
(1989); for a discussion of this see Brassett 1994; see also fn.11. 
 
7  The first English translation of this appeared as ‘How to Make Yourself a Body Without 
Organs’ in Peraldi 1981:265-270. 
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The BwO is opposed to . . . the organism, the organic organisation of the 
organs. The judgement of God, the system of the judgement of God, the 
theological system, is precisely the operation of He who makes an organism, 
an organisation of the organs called the organism, because He cannot bear 
the BwO, because He pursues it and rips it apart so He can be first, and have 
the organism be first.  (Deleuze and Guattari 1988:158-9)  
The BwO is not averse to organs, as such, but to their hierarchisation into the 
organism. ‘Modern Primitives’ should be afraid of the BwO. To the ‘Modern 
Primitive’ the BwO acts as a wind blowing away the spirits congregating on the 
organised body leaving it without a system of meaning with which to Be. Each 
metallic insertion, each wounding inscription, each painful overcoding of a 
ruptured Body as the ‘Being-Organised’ of the ‘Modern Primitive’ (Fakir 
Musafar’s  ‘Worship Through The Body’8), talismanically wards off the BwO.    
 As the Body Modifier disturbs the surface structure of its body with marks 
or objects, it can’t help but become a BwO, disorganising that which the dominant 
culture demands should be whole or perfect. The tongue, for example, once 
pierced, ceases to be merely an organ with which one speaks, eats, licks. . . . The 
pierced-tongue begins to work according to its own desires, flicking, poking, 
tapping, twisting and pulsating – the ordinary organisations in which the tongue 
works have become disrupted with a needle and 3cm long barbell. ‘Rite of 
Passage’?  ‘Expression of Self’? Don’t make me laugh – a pierced body-part has 
disengaged from the accepted codings of (whatever) culture it worked itself into.  
To overlay ‘ritual’ or ‘individuation’ upon an act of piercing is a gross act of 
bodily oppression, or self-delusion. That the BwO, in certain hands, then 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
8   ‘But what is the value of a gift to a deity?  Certainly love, intent and adoration count a 
lot.  But is there more that one can offer?  In cultures that worship through the body, the 
extra something is often the body itself’ (Musafar 1994b:4). 
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reterritorialises9 upon the idea of the Primitive, is an unfortunate outcome. In 
discussing Artaud (who else?) once more, in their Qu’est-ce que la philosophie? 
(1991), Deleuze and Guattari write: 
Artaud said: write for illiterates – speak for aphasics, think for acephalics.  
But what does this ‘for’ mean?  It isn’t ‘with the intention of . . . ’, or even 
‘in the place of . . . ’, it is ‘before’ [devant].  It is a question of becoming 
[devenir].  The thinker isn’t acephalic, aphasic or illiterate, but becomes it.  
He becomes Indian not to finish becoming, rather ‘in order that’ the Indian 
(who is Indian) becomes something else and tears himself away from his 
agony.  (Deleuze and Guattari 1991:105)  
Becoming, they write here, is always a double action: a becoming something,  and 
an allowing of that thing to become something else. Thus they get away from the 
Idealisation of the thing towards which Becoming moves, according to which the 
progressive Modernist Becoming – so missed by Harvey – is defined. And the 
‘Modern Primitive’s’ regressive approach to Becoming is circumvented too; for 
what else does their ‘becoming-Indian’ (for example) denote other than a situating 
of the place of that Indian (Idealisation)? Thus Becoming should not be regarded as 
a teleology but a process: a process which operates on multiple vectors in the 
promotion of a smooth space.10 The implication of all this is that – in the terms 
                                                
9  This is an important term in the works of Deleuze and Guattari. In their ‘Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia’ volumes they identify three processes for the organisation (or otherwise) 
of flows. These are: territorialisation, deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation. The 
production of a Territory – a territorialisation – comes about when flows on the Plane of 
Consistency are organised into a whole hierarchical system. Deterritorialisation, quite 
simply, describes the dissolution of these territorial growths, reinvigorating the plane of 
consistency. Similarly, reterritorialisation describes the turning back of a deterritorialised 
flow to the uniformity of a territory. These terms are used and explained in great detail in 
the fourth chapter of Deleuze and Guattari 1991, entitled ‘Géophilosophie’, pp.83-108. 
 
10  Deleuze and Guattari detail three distinctions between smooth and striated space, the 
third of which runs as follows: ‘Finally, there is a third difference, concerning the surface 
or space.  In striated space, one closes off a surface and “allocates” it according to 
determinate intervals, assigned breaks; in the smooth, one “distributes” oneself in an open 
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favoured by Deleuze and Guattari – the practice of Body Modification is one of 
deterritorialisation. 
 In order to examine this claim further, we need to take the line of flight of 
the Cyborg: for once we have seen the Cyborg disorganise the hierarchical territory 
of the body (and its organs), we shall be able to see the relationship it has with 
Body Modification and deterritorialisation. 
 
Cyborgs and subjectivities 
 
In the wake of the data-processing and robotics revolutions, the rise of 
genetic engineering, and the globalisation of markets, neither human work 
nor the natural habitat can return, even to their state of being a few decades 
ago. . . . The proper way to deal with what we have to acknowledge as a de 
facto situation is to reorientate it – which implies a redefinition in terms of 
contemporary conditions of the objectives and methods of each and every 
form of movement of the social.  (Guattari 1989b:135)  
 
For Guattari, the programme for this reorientation runs in terms of social, mental 
and environmental ecologies (what he also terms – as I have, following him – 
cartographies). What comes out of this process but the Cyborg? The question of 
subjectivity becomes more forcibly posed, Guattari argues, the further ‘machines 
of production, signs, images, syntax and artificial intelligence’ are developed 
(Guattari 1989b:134). In ‘The Three Ecologies’ the method of cartography 
involves critique and the articulation of new possibilities.11 It is clear, he argues 
                                                                                                                                                       
space, according to frequencies and in the course of one’s crossings (logos and nomos)’ 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1987:481). The relationship with the concepts of territorialisation 
etc. (see fn.10) should be noted. 
 
11  ‘By their very essence, analytical cartographies reach far beyond the existential territories 
to which they are assigned.  Like artists and writers, the cartographers of subjectivity 
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(along with many others) that technological innovations have resonances far 
exceeding the particular domains in which they occur. Such innovations are not 
intrinsically transgressive, however. The genesis of much new technology is in the 
laboratories of the Capitalist Machine. If De Landa’s book shows us anything, it is 
the proximity of Cyborg production and the Capitalist War Machine. But the ways 
of territorialisation, reterritorialisation and deterritorialisation are interwoven with 
extreme complexity. The Capitalist Machine’s ideal techno-subjective innovation 
would be an Artificial Intelligence (AI): a thinking, individual, slave machine – a 
reterritorialisation of deterritorialised techno-flows. The Cyborg has a different 
Becoming altogether.  The techno-flows of the Cyborg should be left to 
deterritorialise . . . but how? 
 Both De Landa and Kelly (in his Out of Control [1994]), view Cyborg 
production very differently to the making of an AI. One of the most striking claims 
made by De Landa is that research into AI is somewhat misguided. Why bother 
trying to replicate human intelligence in a machine, the closing sections of his 
book ask, when the possibilities of adding to human intelligence appear to be so 
much more exciting? One of the prime movers of research into AI, De Landa 
explains, was the US Defense Department’s need to remove humans from the 
decision-making loop in the ‘playing’ of war games. (Whatever the scenario, 
human players just could not instigate all-out nuclear war; so in order for those in 
charge of Military strategy, tactics and logistics to prepare for its eventuality, 
humans had to be replaced by intelligent machines, which would have no such 
compunction for avoiding Armageddon.)   
 The trouble is, as the need for increased machine intelligence is required – to 
                                                                                                                                                       
should seek, then, with each concrete performance, to develop and innovate, to create 
new perspectives . . . ’ (Guattari 1989b:133). 
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remove ‘soft’  humans from each rung of the military decision making process 
(until the ideal is reached: a mechanised soldier with the ability to identify and 
destroy enemies on its own) – the most fundamental problems arise. De Landa 
describes some human functions that neither software nor hardware can (yet) 
imitate: these are photoanalysis and cryptanalysis – which, for the civilian, means 
the ability to make sense of three-dimensional space and the ability to translate 
from one language into another. Any form of working machine vision or 
translation needs to interface, somewhere along the data-processing loop, with  
what William Gibson’s console jockeys call ‘meat’.12 That is, in order to create 
machines which operate intelligently, the best thing is to create a new construct out 
of the interface of human and computer. And so we have what Dr Fred Brooks of 
the University of North Carolina, terms Intelligence Augmentation (IA)13 . . . the 
making of the cybernetic organism. 
 Cyborgs trickled onto the cultural scene via an article written by Manfred E. 
Clynes and Nathan S. Kline for Aeronautics (September 1960), called ‘Cyborgs 
and Space’. This article explains that if space travel is to become a future 
possibility, then the production of Cyborgs will be a necessity. The epigraph states: 
‘Altering man’s bodily functions to meet the requirements of extraterrestrial 
environments would be more logical than providing an earthly environment for 
him in space . . . Artefact-organism systems which would extend man’s 
unconscious, self-regulatory controls are one possibility’ (Gray 1995:29).  After 
                                                
12  See Gibson 1986. 
 
13  ‘In the AI community, the objective is to replace the human mind by the machine and its 
database.  In the IA community, the objective is to build systems that amplify the human 
mind by providing it with computer-based auxiliaries that do the things that the mind has 
trouble doing’  (Rheingold 1992:37). 
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much technical discussion (of items such as the Rose osmotic pump,14 and its 
insertion into laboratory mice) the authors conclude: ‘Solving the many 
technological problems involved in manned space flight by adapting man to his 
environment, rather than vice versa, will not only mark a significant step forward 
in man’s scientific progress, but may well provide a new and larger dimension for 
man’s spirit as well’ (Gray 1995:33). Even at their conception, the wider 
psychological, social and cultural significance of Cyborg production was 
recognised. The question remains, in whose hands would such productions be 
trusted? Writers like Joseba Gabilondo – in his ‘Postcolonial Cyborgs.  
Subjectivity in the Age of Cybernetic Reproduction’ – regard Cyborgs as, at best, 
figures of a dreamed Utopia, or, at worst, ‘the hegemonic subject position that 
[capitalism’s] ideology privileges’ (Gray 1995:424). This response is 
understandable, insofar as it goes: once the Cyborg has been found a convenient 
place in which to be pigeonholed, the writer leaves, clapping the dust from his 
hands after a fit-up job well done. Of course the Cyborg is borne from the myriad 
flows of capital through various military and industrial complexes,  but like many 
other technological innovations funded by – what Guattari in ‘The Three 
Ecologies’ calls – ‘Integrated World Capitalism’ (Guattari 1989b: passim), once 
generated  the ‘product’ seems to have a life of its own, like a socio-cultural 
virus.15 This discussion, however, anticipates one which follows concerning the 
relationship between the production of schizos and BwOs.  
 Much work has been done over the past decade on the production and 
                                                
14  ‘[F]or continuous slow injections of biochemically active substances at a biological rate’ 
(Gray 1995:31). 
 
15  Such  a cultural virulence can be seen happening with the genesis of personal computers 
via the Hacker parasites in the 70s, or the dissemination of LSD from the CIA via the 
psychedelic underground in the 60s. 
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cultural significance of Cyborgs, by Donna Haraway,16 A. R. Stone17 and other 
writers in the Feminist tradition. For Haraway, the production of Cyborgs 
necessarily dissolves the subjective and bodily boundaries cherished by the History 
of Occidental Philosophy and Science. Haraway’s aim is to provide for a writing of 
the body which disorganises the structure placed upon it by traditional scientific 
and philosophical discourses. She dismisses the traditional limits between Human 
and Animal, Human and Machine, and the Physical and the Non-Physical, in order 
to create an entity that is essentially transgressive. Haraway writes: 
The cyborg is a creature in a post-gender world; it has no truck with 
bisexuality, Pre-Oedipal symbiosis, unalienated labor, or other seductions to 
organic wholeness through final appropriation of all the powers of the parts 
into a higher unity. In a sense, the cyborg has no origin story in the Western 
sense; a ‘final’ irony since the cyborg is also the awful apocalyptic telos of 
the ‘West’s’ escalating dominations of abstract individuation, an ultimate 
self untied at last from all dependency, a man in space. . . . The cyborg is 
resolutely committed to partiality, irony, intimacy, and perversity.  (Haraway 
1985:67)  
On the whole this seems quite appealing. Haraway muddies the boundaries 
between bodies (and everything else) and describes the resulting existential soup in 
terms of ‘biotic’ information processing systems. We see the tantalising presence 
of ‘perversity’, ‘irony’  and  a certain amount of desire. But this seems to be 
counterbalanced by such gestures towards the tradition of organisation as ‘telos’, 
‘individuation’ and ‘self’. With Cyborgs like this, is it any wonder that Gabilondo 
cannot see anything other than the influence of capitalist hegemony? 
 Which brings us up to schizos and back to BwOs. For many commentators – 
Gabilondo and Harvey alike – the schizo is one of the most pernicious creations of 
                                                
16  Particularly since Haraway 1985. 
 
17  See Stone 1991 and ‘Split Subjects...’ in Gray 1995. 
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PoMo thought.  Harvey writes: 
Deleuze and Guattari . . . , in their supposedly playful exposition Anti-
Oedipus,  hypothesise a relationship between schizophrenia and capitalism 
that prevails ‘at the deepest level of one and the same economy, one and the 
same production process’, concluding that ‘our society produces schizos the 
same way that it produces Prell shampoo or Ford cars, the only difference 
being that schizos are not saleable.’ [Anti-Oedipus, p.245] (Harvey 1990:53)  
and Gabilondo: ‘Claims for the Schizophrenic logic of the postmodern ‘Subject’ 
try to incorporate the modern Subject into postmodernism through the logic of 
nostalgia, which tries to reincorporate cultural logics and elements from the past 
into the present – history as nostalgic device’ (Gray 1995:429). The most in-depth 
account of the productive relationship between capitalism and schizophrenia is 
given in Chapter 3 of Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus (1984) (particularly 
sections 9 and 10). This is a notoriously difficult and long chapter and a brief map 
should be made here of this relationship. 
 Capitalism refers to a particular way of corresponding to the general flow of 
capital. On the whole, Capitalism tries to slow down this flow, these flows, in 
order to agglomerate, congeal, organise capital in the hope of maximising, or 
realising, its own ends. The Capitalist Machine converges with the Schizophrenic 
insofar as it deterritorialises the hierarchisations performed by other machines 
(what they call the Primitive Territorial Machine and the Barbarian Despotic 
Machine), decoding their formations and smoothing out their stratifications.  This, 
however, is only part of the story. If it wasn’t, then Harvey, for example, would be 
correct in saying that Schizophrenia and Capitalism were commensurate with each 
other. The Capitalist Machine may have deterritorialised the flows of Capital 
across the entire face of the planet, it may have co-opted the speedy, Nomadic War 
Machine, but each of these processes has been subject to an even greater 
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organisation by the Capitalist Machine: what Deleuze and Guattari call an 
axiomatisation and reterritorialisation. They write: 
The flows are decoded and axiomatised by capitalism at the same time.  
Hence schizophrenia is not the identity of capitalism, but on the contrary its 
difference, its divergence, and its death. . . . Hence one can say that 
schizophrenia is the exterior limit of capitalism itself or the conclusion of its 
deepest tendency, but that capitalism only functions on condition that it 
inhibit this tendency, or that it push back or displace this limit, by 
substituting for it its own immanent relative limits, which continually 
reproduces on a wider scale. It axiomatises with one hand what it decodes 
with the other. (Deleuze and Guattari 1984:246)  
The schizophrenic processes, used so successfully by Capitalism to deterritorialise, 
thus lurk at its perimeters like wild animals outside an encampment. The schizo, 
then, is no mere playful image tweaked by Deleuze and Guattari into an intricate 
system of metaphorics: it is the dangerous limit, ‘tendency’ and product of the 
Capitalist Machine.18 Thus Schizoanalysis (the critique of the limits of the 
movement of the Capitalist Machine) and cartography coincide. Both are interested 
in deterritorialisation, both emphasise Becoming over Being, both map the process 
by which contemporary subjectification operates.19 The Cyborg was, for Haraway, 
the West’s ‘awful apocalyptic telos’; following the processes of Schizo formations 
under Capitalism described above, I would rather characterise it as both its 
‘dangerous limit’ and ‘tendency’.  Therefore, the Schizo and the Cyborg – which 
are both subjective constructs of the Capitalist Machine (De Landa shows that 
Cyborgs are the material products at the cutting edge of military technology) – 
                                                
18  We should note – as, indeed, Harvey does (Harvey 1990:53), although he later forgets 
this in order to deride the work of Deleuze and Guattari (Harvey 1990:352) – that the 
schizo is not the clinical schizophrenic, subjectified by psychiatry. 
 
19  See Guattari 1989a. 
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should be of interest to anyone involved in critique. This is compounded by the 
fact that they both describe subjective processes which are necessarily 
transgressive of the boundaries laid down by Capitalism (hence its desire to tightly 
constrain them as Institutional Beings or Artificial Intelligences).   
 I doubt if Fakir Musafar would be pleased with my identification of his 
‘Modern Primitive’ practice with the stratifications of contemporary Capitalism.  
But, after everything that has gone before, can his practice be seen as anything 
other than overcoding, axiomatisation or reterritorialisation? Once again, this 
presupposes that the act of Body Modification is irrevocably bound up with 
processes that deterritorialise.   
 
 
Final Remarks 
 
Harvey has nothing but contempt for Deleuze and Guattari’s works. For him they 
epitomise the PoMo approach to, and analysis of, subjectivity under contemporary 
capitalism. All those schizos and nomads! But on even the most superficial of 
glances, we can see that Deleuze and Guattari don’t easily fit onto Harvey’s map of 
contemporary philosophy and politics. Deleuze and Guattari advocate 
Schizoanalysis and smooth space, Becoming and the BwO, cartography and 
critique. Becoming has nothing to do with points, points of view or supposedly 
PoMo Being; and nothing to do with progress, the primacy of the avant-garde that 
Harvey pinpoints as Modernist Becoming. In true nomad style, Deleuze and 
Guattari’s philosophy swarms across the boundaries of Harvey’s outline of 
Modernism and PoMo. Where does this leave us with respect to Cyborgs and Body 
Modification?   
 The  cyber-artist and performer Stelarc has moved in his ‘shows’ from 
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piercing the body to extending it. After ‘the three films of the inside of the 
stomach, lungs and colon/the 25 body suspensions [by large meathooks high above 
city streets]’ (Stelarc 1995:93) he now amplifies diverse aspects of his bodily 
functions with a variety of sensors and transducers. Stelarc’s desire is the emptying 
of the body of organs, replacing their functions with much more durable techno 
versions on the surface of the skin, in the hope (similarly expressed by Clynes and 
Kline in their ‘Cyborgs and Space’ article) that new environments (extraterrestrial 
or informational) can be more accessible.  Stelarc’s body modifications are 
diametrically opposite to those of Fakir Musafar – even if, physically, they seem 
quite similar. If Body Modifiers were not easily seen as ‘primitive’ Cyborgs, then 
Stelarc’s example proves it. 
 We should remember, however, that Body Modification is not just about 
piercing. Body Modifiers have tattoos, scars, prostheses, spectacles and contact 
lenses, cars and bicycles, and a different outfit for every occasion. In all of these 
cases we can see the flowering of the cyborg, the making of the BwO, with all 
manner of what Lotringer calls ‘technophilic intensity’ (Lotringer 1981:274).  That 
these intensities can be turned back onto the stratifications of Capitalism (even 
when they are done in the name of alterity – witness the ‘Modern Primitive’) is 
important insofar as such reterritorialisations can be avoided.   
 In the closing article of the SEMIOTEXT(E) collection Polysexuality, 
Sylvère Lotringer writes: ‘Technophilic intensity (speed and fusion) automatically 
liberates all the other potentialities of becoming (Becoming-animal, or plant, or 
thing) that are closely closeted in what the culture keeps calling – God knows why 
– the free individual’ (Lotringer 1981:274). This is the project of Stelarc’s 
performances and the result of Deleuze and Guattari’s Schizoanalyses. This is also 
what articulates Tetsuo – the Iron Man. Tetsuo is shown in some of the film’s early 
scenes inserting pieces of grimy metal into his body.  After an accident – in which 
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a speeding car smashes into his newly cyborged leg – his body develops strange 
powers, growing metallic prostheses and amalgamating bits of junk until, by the 
film’s conclusion, he has Become Cyborg. Tetsuo is the archetypal Body Modifier: 
he needs the metal he crams into it. His organised body just isn’t good enough. 
And, once he has coalesced with the salaryman responsible for his accident, they 
head off to cyborgise the world. 
 For De Landa, to Become Cyborg involves ‘establishing a “partnership” 
with computers and on allowing the evolutionary paths of both humans and 
machines to enter into a symbiotic relationship’ (De Landa 1991:10). As I 
intimated above, this doesn’t just involve computers: the driver of a car has 
extended the limits, form and function of her body in new and different ways; 
similarly with the player of electronic games. The Doctor who confronts the 
anxious salaryman, in Tetsuo. The Iron Man, remarks, ‘There’s a piece of metal 
stuck in your brain!  I can’t believe you’re still alive! . . . You’ll die if it’s 
removed. Think of it as a piece of jewelry.’ So, until nanobots, 
hardware/software/wetware interfaces, or intelligent prostheses become readily 
available, I’ll have to make do with these bits of surgical steel jewellery.   
Jamie BRASSETT 
Camberwell College of Arts 
Central Saint Martins College of Art & Design 
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  fig. 5 fig.6 
 
 
Illustrations 
 
All original work is reprinted with the kind permission of the individuals and 
organisations concerned. 
 
figs. 1 & 6 Images created and mutated by Kurt (artist, game designer and 
computer animator) of AURA VISUAL (London 1996). 
 
fig. 2 Author has his tongue pierced. (Still from the television documentary, ‘Pins 
and Needles’ [Harris 1995 (original in colour)].) 
 
fig. 3 Photograph of Ron Athey (by Jeremy Cadaver), Torture Garden flyer, 
Saturday 5th October, 1996; also in Wood 1996:63. 
 
fig. 4 Stelarc with Third Arm (by K. Oki [original in colour]) in Stelarc 1995:92. 
 
fig. 5 The salaryman expresses his feelings after having mutated and coalesced 
with the Tetsuo cyborg. (Still from Tetsuo. The Iron Man  [Tsukamoto 1993].) 
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